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Introduction 
 
The paper has a theoretical orientation. Its main purpose is to present a new 
framework for understanding the governance of non-profit organisations in terms of 
multiple theoretical perspectives and a number of key paradoxes or tensions that 
boards face. The paper addresses two related problems.  
 
First, the governance of non-profit organisations is relatively under theorised in 
comparison with the governance of business corporations. In addition, the literatures 
on corporate governance and non-profit governance have developed largely separately 
from each other (Middleton, 1987; Herman and Van Til, 1989, Hung, 1998). 
Noticeable exceptions include resource dependency theory and the study of elites 
(Middleton, 1987). In contrast a variety of competing theories have been proposed to 
try to understand the role of boards in the private sector e.g. agency theory, 
stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and managerial hegemony theory. The paper 
briefly reviews each of these theories and discusses how they can be usefully 
extended to throw light on non-profit boards. A framework is presented for comparing 
and contrasting these different theoretical perspectives on boards. 
 
However, this raises a second related problem. Taken individually the different 
theoretical perspectives are rather one dimensional, only illuminating a particular 
aspect of the board’s role. This has lead to calls for a new conceptual framework that 
can help integrate the insights of these different perspectives (Hung, 1998: 108-9; 
Tricker, 2000: 295). The paper argues that a paradox perspective offers a promising 
approach to providing this new conceptual framework. It argues that taken together 
these multiple theoretical perspectives are helpful in highlighting some of the 
important ambiguities, tensions and paradoxes that non-profit boards face. 
 
 
Based on this framework the paper outlines some of these key paradoxes: 
• The tension between board members acting as representatives for particular 
stakeholder groups and ‘experts’ charged with driving the performance of the 
organization forward. 
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• The tension between the board roles of driving organizational performance and 
ensuring conformance i.e. that the organisation behaves in an accountable and 
prudent manner. 
• The tension between the contrasting board roles of controlling and supporting 
management. 
• The ambiguities that stem from accountabilities to multiple stakeholders. 
 
Each of the paradoxes is discussed and illustrated by drawing on examples from 
recent empirical studies by the author and other researchers (Cornforth and Edwards, 
1998; Cornforth, 2001).  These will examine how the paradoxes manifested 
themselves in particular non-profit organisations, and the different patterns of 
behaviour that resulted. 
 
Finally the paper concludes by considering the implications of taking a paradox 
perspective for future research on non-profit governance. 
 
 
 
Competing theoretical perspectives  
 
Although theories like resource dependency theory have been developed at least 
partly in relation to public and non-profit organisations the governance of public and 
non-profit organisations is relatively under theorised. In contrast a variety of 
competing theories have been proposed to try to understand the role of boards in the 
private sector, for example agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and 
managerial hegemony theory. Below each of these theoretical perspectives is briefly 
examined and how they can be usefully extended to throw light on non-profit boards. 
 
Agency theory – a compliance model 
 
Principal - agent theory, or agency theory for short, has been the dominant theory of 
the corporation and corporate governance arrangements. It assumes that the owners of 
an enterprise (the principal) and those that manage it (the agent) will have different 
interests. Hence the owners or shareholders of any enterprise face a problem that 
managers are likely to act in their own interests rather than to their benefit. While free 
markets are seen as the best restraint on managerial discretion, agency theory sees 
existing corporate governance arrangements as another means to ensure that 
management acts in the best interests of shareholders (see Keasey et al (1997: 3-5) for 
a more detailed overview). From this perspective the main function of the board is to 
control managers.  This suggests that a majority of directors of companies should be 
independent of management, and that their primary role is one of ensuring managerial 
compliance – i.e. to monitor and if necessary control the behaviour of management to 
ensure it acts in the shareholders best interests. 
 
One difficulty in applying an agency perspective to non-profit organisations is that 
there is much more potential ambiguity over who the principals or owners are. In the 
case of voluntary organisations for example is it the original founders of the 
organisation, its funders, its beneficiaries or members? In the case of quasi-
governmental organisations (quangos) is it the general public, users, taxpayers or the 
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government itself? However, many aspects of this perspective still have relevance. 
The principles and regulations concerning charitable trusts, which affect many 
voluntary organisations in the UK, embody similar ideas on the role of governance.  
Under trust law the trustees of a charity are appointed to look after the money and 
resources donated by those founding the organisation and to see that their wishes, as 
set out in the trust deed, are carried out.  It is enshrined in trust law that the trustees 
themselves can not benefit financially from the trust, and so employees of a trust 
cannot normally be trustees.  Legally the key role of the trustees of a charity is to see 
that the staff or management of the organisation carries out the objectives of the trust 
and act in compliance with the law.  As there is a complete separation of the board 
members from staff or management it could be argued that trust law is even more in 
line with an agency or compliance model of governance than company law. Given its 
origins in traditional ideas of philanthropy and charity Harris (1994) identifies this as 
the ‘traditional’ model for charity boards. Similarly, in quangos it can be argued that 
the public’s or state’s interests are at risk from managers pursuing their own interests, 
and so a key role of the board is again to monitor management and ensure there 
compliance in furthering the organisation’s objectives. 
Stewardship theory – a partnership model 
 
Stewardship theory (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) is grounded in a human relations 
perspective (Hung, 1998) and starts from opposite assumptions to agency theory. It 
assumes that managers want to do a good job and will act as effective stewards of an 
organisation’s resources. As a result senior management and shareholders (or the 
mandators) of the organisation are better seen as partners. Hence, the main function of 
the board is not to ensure managerial compliance or conformance, but to improve 
organisational performance. The role of the board is primarily strategic, to work with 
management to add value to top decisions. In this context it is not surprising that 
management ideas and practices should be applied to governance. From this 
perspective board members should be selected on the basis of their expertise and 
contacts so that they are in a position to add value to the organisation's decisions; 
boards and managers should receive proper induction and training; they should know 
how to operate effectively as a team etc.  Ideas such as these are common in much of 
the ‘how-to-do-it’ literature on non-profit boards,  (see for example Kirkland (1994)). 
 
This perspective is evident in various prescriptive models of governance in both the 
private and non-profit sectors. For example, Pound (1995) suggests what he calls the 
'governed corporation model' of governance for public companies.  In this model the 
board, and major shareholders, are seen as partners of management, and the prime 
function of the board is to add value to the organisation by improving its top decision-
making. Carver (1990) in his policy governance model for non-profit organisations 
advocates that the real business of governance is to make policy, articulate the 
mission and sustain the vision of the organisation. 
Resource dependency theory – a co-optation model 
 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salacik, 1978) views organisations as 
interdependent with their environment. Organisations depend crucially for their 
survival on other organisations and actors for resources. As a result they need to find 
ways of managing this dependence and ensuring they get the resources and 
ARNOVA paper 2001;20/03/09 4 
information they need. From this perspective the board is seen as one means of 
reducing uncertainty by creating influential links between organisations through for 
example interlocking directorates. The main functions of the board are to maintain 
good relations with key external stakeholders in order to ensure the flow of resources 
into and from the organisation, and to help the organisation respond to external 
change. 
 
The role of the board is very much a boundary-spanning role. Board members are 
selected for the important external links and knowledge they can bring to the 
organisation, and to try to co-opt external influences. For example it is quite common 
in the UK for local voluntary organisations to be at least partly dependent on local 
government for resources and support  and to include representatives of the local 
authority on their boards. 
A democratic or association perspective – a democratic model 
 
Democratic government is a central institution in Western societies. Key ideas and 
practices include: open elections on the basis of one person one vote; pluralism i.e. 
that representatives will represent different interests; accountability to the electorate; 
the separation of elected members, who make policy, from the executive, who 
implement policy decisions. Democratic ideas and practices have influenced thinking 
about the governance of many types of organisations. For example many voluntary 
organisations, co-operatives and mutual organisations are established as membership 
associations, where it is enshrined in the organisation’s constitution that the governing 
body should be elected by and represent the membership in some way. Conversely, 
the governance of many quangos is often criticised for not living up to ideas of 
democratic accountability (Plummer, 1994; Skelcher, 1998). 
 
A democratic perspective on governance suggests that the job of board is to represent 
the interests of members of the organisation. The role of board is to resolve or choose 
between the interests of different groups and set the overall policy of the organisation, 
which can then be implemented by staff. Central to this view is the idea of a lay or 
non-professional board, where anyone can put himself or herself forward for election 
as a board member.  Expertise is not a central requirement, as it is in the partnership 
model. 
Stakeholder theory – a stakeholder model 
 
Stakeholder theory as applied to governing bodies is based on the premise that 
organisations should be responsible to a range of groups (or stakeholders) in society 
other than just an organisation’s owners or mandators (Hung, 1998: 106). By 
incorporating different stakeholders on boards it is expected that organisations will be 
more likely to respond to broader social interests than the narrow interests of one 
group. This leads to a political role for boards negotiating and resolving the 
potentially conflicting interests of different stakeholder groups in order to determine 
the objectives of the organisation and set policy. 
 
Stakeholder theory has developed mainly in debates over corporate governance in the 
private sector, where there has been robust debate about its desirability and likely 
consequences (e.g. Hutton, 1997; Tricker, 2000: 295). The principles of stakeholder 
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involvement are less controversial in the public and non-profit sectors, and the 
practice more common, although not always discussed in terms of stakeholder theory. 
Some of the clearest examples in the UK are in the field of education where 
government reforms have specified the broad composition of governing bodies. For 
example, state funded schools are required to have governing bodies made up of 
people appointed or elected from various groups, including: parents, the Local 
Education Authority, teacher governors, and in the case of voluntary aided schools 
foundation governors representing the church or charity supporting the school. When 
further education (FE) colleges were taken out of local government control the 
Conservative government specified that at least half the governors should be from 
business broadly construed. Due to concerns about lack of balance and accountability 
the composition was broadened by the Labour government in 1999 to include 
representatives of staff, students, the local authority and community. In parts of the 
voluntary sector there have been important moves to involve service users on boards. 
Managerial hegemony theory – a ‘rubber stamp’ model 
 
Managerial hegemony theory relates back to the thesis of Berle and Means (1932) that 
although shareholders may legally own and control large corporations they no longer 
effectively control them. Control having been effectively ceded to a new professional 
managerial class.  A variety of empirical studies have leant support to this thesis.  
Mace (1971) in his study of US directors concluded that boards did not get involved 
in strategy except in crises, and that control rested with the president (chief executive) 
rather than the board. Herman (1981) came to similar conclusions but argued that 
managerial power was always in the context of various constraints and the latent 
power of stakeholders such as external board members.  In a more recent study 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) conclude that although the functioning of boards has 
improved since Mace’s study, their performance still leaves much room for 
improvement. Like Mace they distinguish between boards in normal times and during 
crises, and conclude that during normal times power usually remains with the chief 
executive. From this perspective the board ends up as little more than a ‘rubber 
stamp’ for management’s decisions. Its function is essentially symbolic to give 
legitimacy to managerial 
 
Although this theory was developed in the study of large business corporations, many 
of the processes it describes seem just as relevant to public and non-profit 
organisations: for example the separation of those who found (‘own’) the organisation 
from those that control it, and the increasing growth and professionalisation of 
management. Indeed it could be argued that the largely voluntary nature of board 
involvement in public and non-profit organisations might mean that board power is 
even more limited than in the private sector. Murray et al (1992) identified five 
different patterns of power relations among non-profit boards in Canada.  One of the 
most common was what they called the CEO-dominated board, where chief executive 
and sometimes other senior managers exercise the main power and the board plays a 
largely symbolic role, often rubber stamping decisions. 
 
The main features of these different perspectives are summarised in Table 1. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
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A paradox perspective - towards a synthesis 
 
Taken individually these different theories are rather one dimensional, and have been 
criticised for only illuminating a particular aspect of the board’s work. This has lead 
to calls for a new conceptual framework that can help integrate the insights of these 
different perspectives (Hung, 1998: 108-9; Tricker, 2000:295). A paradox perspective 
offers a promising approach to providing this new conceptual framework. Taken 
together these multiple theoretical perspectives are helpful in highlighting some of the 
important ambiguities, tensions and paradoxes that non-profit boards face. 
 
Morgan (1986: 339) in his groundbreaking study of organisations argues that many 
theories and ways of thinking about organisations do not match the complexity and 
sophistication of the realities organisations face. In order to address this problem he 
argues that it is necessary to take a multi-paradigm or perspective approach in order to 
‘understand and grasp the multiple meanings of situations and to confront and manage 
contradiction and paradox, rather than pretend they do not exist’. At the same time 
there has be a growing recognition that many management problems and issues 
require a move from linear thinking and simple either/or choices to seeing them as 
paradoxes (e.g. Hampden-Turner, 1990; Handy, 1995). Managing paradox means 
embracing and exploring tensions and differences rather than choosing between them. 
As Lewis (2000) charts in her review of the literature the concept of paradox has been 
playing an increasing role in organisation studies. 
A similar critique can be made of attempts to understand organisational governance. 
As Hung (1998: 108) observes in his review of the literature each of the theories of 
governance (discussed above) ‘focus on a small part and no one is able to perceive the 
whole picture of corporate governance’. In a similar vein Tricker (2000: 295) notes 
‘At the moment various theoretical insights cast light on different aspects of play, 
leaving others in the shadow…’. He calls for a new conceptual framework that can 
‘light up the entire stage and all the players’. 
One way of addressing this problem is to take a multi-paradigm perspective and focus 
more explicitly on the paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions involved in governance. 
As Lewis (2000: 772) discusses a multiple perspectives approach can be useful as 
sensitising device to highlight what are likely to be important paradoxes, by 
contrasting opposing theoretical approaches. So for example contrasting agency 
theory with stewardship theory suggests that boards may experience pressures to both 
control and partner senior management. Next we examine some of the main tensions 
and paradoxes that the contrasting theories of governance suggest that boards are 
likely to face. The list is not meant to be exhaustive. A number of authors have also 
begun to study governance from a paradox perspective. Demb and Neubauer (1992) 
in their study of corporate board identified and examine three paradoxes which stem 
from the legal and structural aspect of the boards setting. Wood (1996) suggests a 
similar approach to studying non-profit boards.  
Who governs -the tension between representative and professional boards  
 
The different theoretical perspectives have different implications for who should serve 
on boards. The opposition is clearest between the stewardship and democratic 
perspectives. Stewardship theory stresses that board members should have expertise 
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and experience that can add value to the performance of the organisation. The 
implication is that board members should be selected for their professional expertise 
and skills. In contrast the democratic perspective (and to some extent the stakeholder 
theory) stresses that board members are lay representatives there to serve the 
constituency(s) or stakeholders they represent.  
 
This can raise an obvious tension for public policy makers – should the boards of 
public bodies be elected or chosen because of their expertise. Since the early 1980’s 
successive Conservative governments in the UK introduced a variety of public sector 
reforms leading to a growth in the number of quangos and public bodies with 
appointed boards. This move to non-elected, expert boards in many parts of the public 
sector has been heavily criticised for its undemocratic nature and the danger of 
creating a new self-selected elite (Skelcher, 1998). While the recent Labour 
government has modified some of these arrangements and introduced greater 
stakeholder involvement, deep concerns over the democratic accountability of many 
of these boards remains (Robinson et al, 2000). 
 
There is also a dilemma for voluntary sector boards - should members be chosen or 
encouraged to stand for election, because of their expertise or because they represent 
some stakeholder group?  It also raises dilemmas for board members.  Are they 
expected to represent particular stakeholders or to give expert guidance?  The 
professional role also demands a close involvement with the organisation.  This may 
conflict with board members’ unpaid status in most non-profit organisations. 
Board roles - the tension between the conformance and performance  
 
The different theories of governance put different emphasise on what are the main 
roles of the board. This is most apparent in the opposition between the agency and 
stewardship perspectives. What Garratt (1996) has called the ‘conformance’ versus 
‘performance’ role of boards. Agency theory emphasises the conformance role of the 
board to ensure that the organisation acts in the interests of its ‘owners’ and to be a 
careful steward of their resources. In contrast stewardship theory emphasises the role 
of the board in driving forward organisational performance through adding value to 
the organisation’s strategy and top decisions. 
 
The conformance role demands careful monitoring and scrutiny of the organisation’s 
past performance and is risk averse.  The performance role demands forward vision, 
an understanding of the organisation and its environment and perhaps a greater 
willingness to take risks.  Again, boards face an obvious tension concerning how 
much attention they should pay to these contrasting roles. 
Relationships with management - the tension between controlling and partnering  
 
The agency and democratic perspectives stress the importance of the board 
monitoring and controlling the work of managers (the executive).  In contrast 
stewardship theory stresses the role of the board as a partner to management, 
improving top management decision-making. 
 
The need to both control senior management and be their support and partner in 
decision making can be a source of role conflict and tension for board members. To 
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what extent should board members push the interests of particular stakeholders if this 
is against the wishes of management?  This tension is vividly illustrated by the 
following comment on an European Union report on parent participation in education 
by the convenor of the Scottish Parent Teacher Council: 
‘Quite often the parents on school boards cease to take parental point of view 
and start to identify more with management...in some cases you can see 
parents on boards closing ranks around the head teacher rather than lobbying 
on behalf of parents’ 
      (From the Scotsman, Page 6, 27/12/95) 
Multiple or ambiguous accountability 
 
There may be tension concerning to whom board members are accountable. The 
agency perspective suggests that board members are accountable to the ‘owners’ of 
the organisation. The democratic and stakeholder perspectives suggests that there are 
other stakeholders who have a legitimate interest in what the organisation does, and 
should in some way be able to hold it to account. Equally the legal framework of 
many public and voluntary bodies mean that board members are legally required to 
act in the organisations best interests rather than in the interest of particular 
stakeholders.  Board members may experience tension because they feel accountable 
to more than one group, or because they are unclear or differ over who feel they are 
accountable to.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper has shown how existing theories of corporate governance can be extended 
to help understand the governance of various types of social enterprise, but that by 
themselves each is too one-dimensional only highlighting particular aspects of the 
board’s role. As empirical research suggests governance is an inherently difficult and 
problematic activity. A paradox perspective helps to explain some of the difficult 
tensions and ambiguities that boards face. 
 
Another criticism that can be levelled at much of the theorising about boards (both 
descriptive and prescriptive) is it generic nature. Often little or no account is taken of 
contextual factors, such as organisational size or changes in public policy, that may 
influence or shape board characteristics or how they work.  This is not something that 
is unique to the study of boards; similar criticisms have been levelled at much recent 
research in the field of organisational behaviour (Mowday and Sutton, 1993; 
Rousseau and Fried, 2001). An important avenue for future research on non-profit 
governance is to examine empirically the different paradoxes, tensions and 
contradictions boards face, and how these are shaped and influenced by contextual 
factors.
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THEORY INTERESTS BOARD 
MEMBERS 
BOARD ROLE MODEL 
Agency theory ‘Owners’ and 
managers have 
different 
interests 
‘Owner/mandators’ 
representatives 
Conformance: 
- safeguard ‘owners’ 
interests 
- oversee management 
- check compliance 
Compliance 
 model 
Stewardship 
theory 
‘Owners’ and 
managers share 
interests 
‘Experts’ Improve performance: 
- add value to top 
decisions/strategy 
- partner/support 
management 
Partnership 
model 
Democratic 
perspective 
Members/the 
public contain 
different 
interests 
 ‘Lay’ 
representatives 
Political: 
- represent member 
interests 
- make policy 
- control executive 
 
Democratic 
model 
 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Stakeholders 
have different 
interests 
Stakeholder 
representatives 
Political: 
-balancing stakeholder 
needs 
- make policy 
- control management 
Stakeholder 
model 
Resource 
dependency 
theory 
Stakeholders 
and organisation 
have different 
interests 
Chosen for 
influence with key 
stakeholders 
Boundary spanning: 
- secure resources 
- stakeholder relations 
- external perspective 
Co-optation 
model 
 
Managerial 
hegemony 
theory 
‘Owners’ and 
managers have 
different 
interests 
‘Owners’ 
representatives 
Symbolic: 
- ratify decisions 
- give legitimacy 
(managers have real 
power) 
‘Rubber 
stamp’ 
model 
 
 
Table 1: A Comparison of Theoretical Perspectives on Organisational Governance 
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